Bayesian Monitoring. by Kirstein, Roland
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft




CSLE Discussion Paper, No. 2005-06
Provided in cooperation with:
Universität des Saarlandes (UdS)
Suggested citation: Kirstein, Roland (2005) : Bayesian Monitoring., CSLE Discussion Paper, No.
2005-06, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23077Bayesian Monitoring.
Roland Kirstein∗
Center for the Study of Law and Economics
Discussion Paper 2005-06, August 2005
Abstract
This paper presents a modiﬁcation of the inspection game: The
“Bayesian Monitoring” model rests on the assumption that judges are
interested in enforcing compliant behavior and making correct decisions.
They may base their judgements on an informative but imperfect sig-
nal which can be generated costlessly. In the original inspection game,
monitoring is costly and generates a perfectly informative signal.
While the inspection game has only one mixed strategy equilibrium,
three Perfect Bayesian Equilibria exist in my model (one in pure strategies,
two in mixed). These outcomes can be described with respect to their
punishment styles: tyrannic, draconian, and lenient.
The Bayesian Monitoring model, just as the inspection game, has dif-
ferent implications than enforcement models in the tradition of Becker
(1968). Total deterrence of bad behavior is impossible, and the equilib-
rium probability of good behavior is independent of the suspect’s own
payoﬀ parameters. Hence, the maximum ﬁne result does not apply.
JEL classiﬁcation: K 40, C 72, D 81
Keywords: Imperfect Decision-Making, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, En-
forcement, Maximum Fine Result
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11 Introduction
This paper analyzes the enforcement of “good” behavior by benevolent but im-
perfect decision-making judges. “Bad” behavior is deﬁned as causing a negative
externality which exceeds the beneﬁt internalized by the oﬀender; it therefore
implies a welfare loss. Thus, good behavior is eﬃcient. Judicial benevolence
is characterized by two assumptions. First, judges prefer higher social welfare.
Hence, they are interested in avoiding welfare losses and encouraging good be-
havior. Second, judges prefer correct judgements over incorrect ones.1 The ﬁrst
assumption would be justiﬁed when the compensation of judges is linked to the
social product. The second assumption reﬂects a preference for justice.2
Another property that characterizes judges in this paper is imperfect
decision-making.3 I assume that judges are not perfectly informed about the
actual behavior of the suspect, although they are not blind. Through exami-
nation of a case, an experienced judge is able to generate an informative signal
which is correlated with what the suspect has actually done.4 I assume this sig-
nal to be costless. A judge might commit two types of errors, namely incorrect
convictions as well as incorrect acquittals.5 The error probabilities provide a
measure for the judge’s monitoring skill. The enforcement system set up in this
paper reﬂects an almost ideal world.6 Judicial errors are caused by information
problems, not by incompatible incentives. The potential problem of how judi-
cial incentives can be aligned with the preferences of society is assumed to be
solved.7 This ideal world, however, is not unrealistic, but close to the actual
situation of judges.
1Posner (1994, 23f.) argues that judicial decisions may, among other factors, be governed
by intrinsic motivation. Also see Macey (1994) and Alexander (1994).
2See Feddersen/Pesendorfer (1998, 24) who assume a negative judicial payoﬀ for wrong
decisions.
3See Kirstein/Schmidtchen (1997).
4The ability to base a judgement on an informative signal can also be interpreted as judicial
competence; see Hadﬁeld (1994).
5See Tullock (1980), (1994), Kirstein/Schmidtchen (1997), or Jost (1997).
6With zero monitoring costs, the model is even closer to an ideal world than the one in
Usman (2002). Introducing costs would complicate the equilibrium analysis without altering
the results, as long as the costs are moderate.
7For the analysis of judicial incentives see, e.g., Posner (1994) or Ander-
son/Shugart/Tollison (1989).
2In the inspection game, a benevolent judge can perfectly observe the sus-
pect’s behavior, but monitoring is costly. Assume that a monitor may choose
to inspect or not, and a suspect may choose between good and bad behavior.
The monitor prefers to inspect if he expects the suspect to behave badly. If,
however, the monitor expects the suspect to choose good behavior, he prefers
to save the inspection costs. Assume furthermore that the suspect prefers good
behavior when inspected, and bad behavior when the monitor abstains from
inspection. Then, the simultaneous one-shot game has no Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies.8 Perfect deterrence, therefore, can never be part of a Nash
equilibrium.
In section 2, I set up the Bayesian monitoring model. It reﬂects the fact
that the interaction between the monitor and the suspect often has a sequential
nature, even if the action of the latter cannot be perfectly observed by the
former. The inspection game as well as models in the tradition of Becker (1968)
abstract from this fact.9
In section 3, I will derive the three Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. In none of
these equilibria is the suspect motivated to choose good behavior with certainty.
The intuition for this result is that a rational judge would not base his decision
on an imperfect signal if he believed the suspect to have chosen good behavior.
Bayesian updating should induce the judge to acquit the suspect, even if the
signal says otherwise. However, the suspect’s best reply to a sure acquittal would
be to commit bad behavior. As in the inspection game, the judge is unable to
induce the suspect to choose good behavior with probability one, even though
it is assumed that his incentives are perfectly aligned and the monitoring signal
is costless.
8See Wittman (1985) or Tsebelis (1989), (1990a), (1990 b). Holler (1990) has questioned
the usage of mixed strategies as the solution concept and proposed Maximin strategies as more
proﬁtable for the players. Wittman (1993), however, has argued that Maximin strategies do
not constitute a Nash equilibrium and therefore lack stability.
9See Polinsky/Shavell (2000) for a survey of the traditional enforcement model. The Becker
approach focuses in a price-theoretical manner on the decision-making of the potential of-
fender, taking the parameters of the enforcement system as exogenous. This approach disre-
gards the strategic interaction between potential oﬀender and a rational enforcer who would
update his beliefs in a Bayesian way. The literature on contract theory acknowledges the
problem of rational updates of monitoring agents. See, e.g., Baiman/May/Mukherji (1990),
Cheng (1990), Mirrlees (1999), Faure-Grimaud/Laﬀont/Martimort (2003).
3The monitoring problem has been discussed in an informal manner by Ed
Schwartz (1995) and Steven Shavell (1995, 1996) with respect to appeals courts.
Schwartz has pointed out that the analysis of appeals courts in Shavell (1995) is
based on the assumption that the judges do not draw Bayesian inferences from
the fact that an appeal has been brought. If judges are modeled as strategic
actors, however, then a separating result (according to which only legitimate
appeals are brought), cannot be part of an equilibrium.
The reply of Shavell (1996) mixes up normative and positive analysis: as a
Bayesian update would lead to undesirable results, it is not desirable that judges
use it.10 To sustain his view, Shavell points out that judges have to base their
decision on written opinions, and Bayesian inference would be unacceptable as
a written opinion. However, the verbal representation of the results of judicial
reasoning does not necessarily have to reﬂect the line of reasoning. Decision
theory predicts that rational judges use Bayesian inference when making their
decisions; an experienced judge will certainly be able to ﬁnd an acceptable
wording for any opinion he has formed this way. Certainly, no judge will come
to a decision only after he has written down the reasons for it.11
My model diﬀers from the one in Reinganum/Wilde (1986), which is a sig-
naling game and not a monitoring game. In their model, the suspect knows
his type and chooses a report which is sent to the enforcement authority. In a
separating equilibrium, the authority can infer the suspect’s type from the re-
port. Both the signaling model and the inspection model address the enforcer’s
commitment problem. If an enforcer is unable to commit to a speciﬁc monitor-
ing strategy, then perfect enforcement cannot be part of an equilibrium as the
enforcer always has an incentive not to monitor when he expects the suspect
to comply with certainty.12 The traditional enforcement theory assumes that
commitment to a speciﬁc enforcement probability is possible.13
10In his earlier article, Shavell has already stressed this point: “...such information should
not be considered in judging...,” see Shavell (1995, 363).
11Modern literature on auditing takes it as self-evident that regulators are not com-
mitted to a speciﬁc reaction to the signals they receive; see, e.g., Khalil (1997, 639) or
Baliga/Corchon/Sj¨ ostr¨ om (1997).
12Also see Khalil/Lawarr´ ee (1995, 443).
13See, among the many contributions to this literature, Becker (1968) or Reinganum/Wilde
(1985); also see Graetz/Reinganum/Wilde (1985). This assumption has been challenged by
4Another model which is diﬀerent from the one presented here is analyzed in
Berentsen/Br¨ ugger/L¨ ortschler (2003). They start with an interaction between
two suspects. The result of this interaction provides a signal to a monitor who
then decides whether to monitor or not. Their model acknowledges the existence
of monitoring costs but assumes the monitor’s signal to be perfect. Thus, judicial
detection skills represented by the quality of the monitoring signal are left out
of focus. These parameters play a central role in my model.
Of the three Perfect Bayesian Equilibria derived in section 3, one is an equi-
librium in pure strategies. The existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is a
crucial diﬀerence from the inspection game. If the judge punishes regardless
of the signal, then the suspect’s best reply is to commit bad behavior. The
other two equilibria involve mixed strategies. In one of these equilibria, the
judge punishes with certainty when he receives the bad signal, and with posi-
tive probability if the signal indicates good behavior. Such a “draconic” judicial
strategy results in a low likelihood of good behavior on the suspect’s side. In the
other mixed strategy equilibrium, the judge does not punish after receiving the
good signal, but does punish with positive probability if the signal is bad. This
“lenient” judicial strategy induces the suspect to choose good behavior with a
higher probability than under the draconic strategy.
Comparative statics analysis demonstrates that the suspect’s equilibrium
probability of choosing good or bad behavior is independent of his own payoﬀ
parameters. The size of the sanction and the suspect’s beneﬁt from a transgres-
sion only inﬂuence the strategy choice of the monitor. This is in line with the
results of the standard inspection game.14
Baker/Miceli (2005) who ﬁnd that apprehension rates are lower if the enforcer can commit
to a punishment strategy and only uses ﬁnes. Commitment, however, may be lead to higher
apprehension rates if both ﬁnes and jail are used.
14Wittman (1985) and Bianco/Ordeshook/Tsebelis (1990). Also see Andreozzi (2004) for
a surprising related result.
52 The Model
Two risk-neutral and rational players, a suspect (S) and a judge (J), play a one-
shot game. It starts with the suspect’s decision between good and bad behavior.
Denote her decision as d = g (for good) or d = b (for bad). It is convenient
to deﬁne the behavioral strategy γ = Pr(d = g). Assume that bad behavior
incurs an internalized beneﬁt, denoted as B > 0, and a negative externality
X > B, while the cost and beneﬁt of good behavior are normalized to zero.
Let W > 0 represent the initial wealth of the suspect.15 When the suspect
has made her choice, nature produces an informative signal, denoted as i. The
signal may assume one out of two realizations, i = g or i = b. The probability
of receiving a particular signal realization is contingent on the suspect’s choice:
r = Pr(i = g|d = g),w = Pr(i = g|d = b) with 1 ≥ r > w ≥ 0.16 The
parameters r and w provide a measure for the judge’s monitoring skill: with
r = 1 and w = 0, he monitors perfectly, with r = w, he has zero monitoring
skill, and the intermediate case 0 < w < r < 1 reﬂects imperfect, but positive
monitoring skill.
The judge is unable to observe the suspect’s actual choice. He only observes
the signal and updates his beliefs using Bayes’ rule. Denote his ex-post beliefs as
µ = Pr(d = g|i = g),ν = Pr(d = g|i = b). The judge then has to decide between
a sanction (j = s) or an acquittal (j = a). I deﬁne the judge’s behavioral
strategies α = Pr(j = s|i = g),β = Pr(j = s|i = b).
Punishment imposes a burden on the suspect, denoted as P, with 0 < P <
W, but no beneﬁt to the judge. But the judge is assumed to be benevolent,
i.e., he has an interest in sanctioning correctly. This is represented by his payoﬀ
parameters G > 0 and L > 0. G reﬂects the judge’s interest in a correctly
issued sanction, i.e., if the suspect has indeed chosen bad behavior. On the
other hand, −L is the judicial loss from issuing an incorrect sanction (if the
suspect’s behavior actually was good). These payoﬀs are revealed only after
15The initial wealth plays no role in the subsequent equilibrium analysis, but eliminates the
judgement proof problem.
16The parameter conﬁguration r ≤ w would also reﬂect a correlation between the signal
realization and the suspect’s choice. This symmetric case can, therefore, be excluded from
consideration. The cases r = w and r = 1,w = 0 will be dealt with later.
6the judicial decision has taken place. I assume sanctions to be ineﬃcient, i.e.,
P > G: the judge’s beneﬁt from a justiﬁed sanction is smaller than the burden
imposed on the suspect.
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Figure 1 displays the interaction of the two players and the signals gen-
erated in the Bayesian Monitoring Game. Both players are assumed to be
risk-neutral. The payoﬀ parameters (W,P,B,X,G,L) and the signal quality
parameters (r,w) are exogenously given and are common knowledge. Thus, the
endogenous variables are α,β,γ,µ, and ν.
73 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, the Bayesian Nash equilibria {(α∗,β∗);(µ∗,ν∗);γ∗} will be de-
rived. α∗,β∗ and γ∗ denote the judge’s and the suspect’s behavioral strategies in
equilibrium, respectively, while µ∗ and ν∗ denote the judge’s equilibrium beliefs.
3.1 The Suspect’s Optimal Choice
The suspect chooses her behavioral strategy γ so as to maximize her expected
payoﬀ, given the behavioral strategies (α,β) which she expects her opponent to
play. Thus, an equilibrium value γ∗ is determined by
γ∗ = argmax {W −γ[rα +(1−r)β]P +(1−γ)B −(1−γ)[wα +(1−w)β]P}.
The ﬁrst derivative with respect to γ is: −P[rα + (1 − r)β] − B + P[wα +
(1 − w)β]. This expression can be rearranged to P(r − w)(β − α) − B, which
allows me to write the suspect’s reaction function γ∗(α,β) as
γ∗ = 1 ⇔ β − α > K
0 < γ∗ < 1 ⇔ β − α = K
γ∗ = 0 ⇔ β − α < K
with K = B
(r−w)P .17 If γ∗ = 0 or γ∗ = 1, then the suspect chooses a pure
strategy, while 0 < γ∗ < 1 represents the choice of a mixed strategy. Figure
2 illustrates the suspect’s reaction function γ∗ = γ∗(α,β). The bold pentagon
in the lower left corner of the ﬁgure includes the (α,β) combinations to which
the suspect’s optimal reaction is γ = 0. The bold triangle in the upper right
corner is situated above the (α,β) combinations which induce the suspect to
choose γ = 1. Finally, the bold square in the center of the ﬁgure describes the
(α,β) combinations that keep the suspect indiﬀerent between all of his mixed
strategies.
17Division by (r − w) is possible as r = w is excluded.
8Figure 2: The Suspect’s Reaction Function
3.2 The Judge’s Optimal Choice
A rational judge chooses his action given his anticipation of the behavioral
strategy chosen by the suspect. From a strategic point of view, the game is
simultaneous. However, the judge observes an imperfect signal triggered by the
suspect’s actual behavior. Therefore, his choice can be made contingent on the
realization of this signal.
First, I examine the judge’s optimal choice after having observed the signal




rγ + w(1 − γ)
(1)
9Taking these ex-post beliefs into account, the judge chooses the his behavioral
strategy α∗ so as to maximize [(1 − µ)(αG − X) − µαL]. The ﬁrst derivative
with respect to α is G−µ(G+L).18 The relation between the optimal α and the
suspect’s strategy choice γ becomes clear if equation (1) is used to substitute
for µ. Then, the ﬁrst derivative can be rewritten as
G −
rγ
rγ + w(1 − γ)
(G + L).





For simplicity, denote the right hand side of this inequality as γ1. The relation
between the suspect’s choice γ and the judicial behavioral strategy after having
observed i = g is summarized in the following reaction function α∗ = α∗(γ):
α∗ = 1 ⇔ γ < γ1
0 < α∗ < 1 ⇔ γ = γ1
α∗ = 0 ⇔ γ > γ1
given w > 0. If w = 0, the ﬁrst derivative is negative and, thus, the judge
chooses α∗ = 0. He would never observe the good signal incorrectly and, thus,
never react with a sanction.
In the same vein, the optimal behavioral strategy β∗(γ) can be derived for
the case in which the judge observes the signal realization i = b. Bayesian
updating induces the ex-post belief
ν =
(1 − r)γ
(1 − r)γ + (1 − w)(1 − γ)
.
and the judge chooses β so as to maximize [(1 − ν)(βG − X) − νβL]. The
ﬁrst derivative with respect to β is G − ν(G + L). Substitution of ν allows to
18An interesting by-product of the analysis is that the negative externality X caused by
the suspect’s behavior is irrelevant for the judge’s decision of whether to issue a sanction or
not. If the suspect has chosen bad behavior, X is sunk. From then on, only G and L and the
judge’s beliefs determine whether he chooses to punish or not.
19The next inequality is equivalent to the “reliability condition” in Heiner (1983), (1986).
See also Swets (1988), (1996).
10state the reaction function β∗ = β∗(γ) as
β∗ = 1 ⇔ γ < γ2
0 < β∗ < 1 ⇔ γ = γ2




(1 − r)L + (1 − w)G
.
Note that r > w, G > 0 and L < ∞ imply γ2 > γ1. Figure 3 displays
the signal-contingent reaction functions of the judge for the case of γ1 > 0 and
γ2 < 1. The reaction function α∗(γ) is represented by the dashed line. The
straight line represents the reaction function β∗(γ).
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The ﬁgure shows that there is no value of γ for which α∗(γ) > β∗(γ) holds.
Furthermore, for γ = γ1 or γ = γ2, exactly one of the judge’s optimal behavioral
strategies α∗ or β∗ is mixed while the other one is pure. These observations are
important for the subsequent equilibrium analysis.
113.3 Bayesian Monitoring Equilibria
In the previous section, I have derived the judge’s reaction functions α∗ = α∗(γ)
and β∗ = β∗(γ), as well as the suspect’s reaction function γ∗ = γ∗(α,β). An
equilibrium combination of behavioral strategies is given by α∗(γ∗),β∗(γ∗), and
γ∗(α∗,β∗). Proposition 1 presents the behavioral strategy combinations which
characterize the three Perfect Bayesian Equilibria.
Proposition 1: In the Bayesian Monitoring Game with G,L > 0
and 0 < w < r < 1, the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria are characterized
by the following combinations of behavioral strategies:
1. tyrannic: γ = 0 and α = β = 1,
2. draconian: γ = γ1 and α = 1 − K,β = 1,
3. lenient: γ = γ2 and α = 0,β = K,
with K = B
(r − w)P , γ1 = wG
rL + wG and γ2 = (1 − w)G
(1 − r)L + (1 − w)G.
The tyrannic equilibrium is the only one in pure strategies. The draconian
equilibrium is characterized by a low rate of compliant (“good”) behavior, as the
suspect faces positive probability of being sanctioned after both signal realiza-
tions. In the lenient equilibirum, the threat of sanctions is rather moderate (only
after the bad signal realizations, and then with a probability smaller than one),
and the rate of good behavior is the highest. In Figure 4 the three equilibria
are shown as bold dots.
The ﬁrst result is rather straightforward: if the suspect chooses bad behavior,
and the judge punishes regardless of the signal realization, both parties will
be conﬁrmed in their decisions and beliefs by the other party’s behavior. In
this equilibrium, the ex-post beliefs of the judge are µ = ν = 0. However, in
comparison to the well-known inspection game, this outcome is surprising, as
the latter does not exhibit pure strategy equilibria.
The third result establishes that it can be rational for a suspect to frequently
choose good behavior under costless judicial monitoring if the judge never pun-
ishes after having observed i = g and only occasionally after i = b. In this
12Figure 4: Bayesian Monitoring Equilibria
equilibrium, the monitor’s ex-post beliefs are
µ =
rγ2
rγ2 + w(1 − γ2)
=
r(1 − w)G




(1 − r)γ2 + (1 − w)(1 − γ2)
=
(1 − r)(1 − w)G





The equilibrium belief ν is independent of (r,w), as the equilibrium choice
of β neutralizes the signal’s imperfection.
Result 2 has a rather strange property. The judge can induce the suspect
to choose good behavior with probability γ1 if he always punishes her after
13having observed the bad signal (β∗ = 1) and also punishes her with a positive
probability after having observed the good signal (α∗ > 0). However, the re-
sulting probability of good behavior is lower than in the lenient equilibrium. In
both mixed strategy equilibria, the monitor is required to choose β > α. If the
distance between these two signal-contingent punishment probabilities is cali-
brated adequately, then the suspect is indiﬀerent between her pure strategies.
This eﬀect can either be attained by choosing α = 0 and an adequately high
β < 1, or by choosing β = 1 and an adequately low α > 0. The monitor’s
ex-post beliefs in the second mixed strategy equilibrium are
µ =
rγ1










(1 − r)γ1 + (1 − w)(1 − γ1)
=
(1 − r)wG
(1 − r)wG + (1 − w)rL
.
Now, it is the equilibrium choice of α that makes the ex-post belief µ inde-
pendent of the signal quality. The impossibility of implementing good behavior
with certainty is directly directly implied by Proposition 1:
Corollary: In the Bayesian Monitoring Game with 0 < w < r <
1, G > 0, and L > 0, neither the judicial strategy (α = 0,β =
1), nor the suspect’s strategy γ = 1 is part of a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium.
This result formalizes what was mentioned verbally in the introduction: if
the judge chooses α = 0 and β = 1, this would indeed induce the suspect to
choose γ = 1. However, the judge’s best reply to γ = 1 would be (α = β = 0)
and not (α = 0,β = 1). If the judge expects the suspect to choose good behavior
with certainty, then it would be irrational to rely on an imperfect signal when
deciding whether or not to punish. To follow the signal would mean to punish the
suspect falsely with a positive probability, namely w. The judge can, however,
avoid any wrongful punishment by simply disobeying the signal realization and
not punishing at all (α = β = 0). Therefore, (α = 0,β = 1) cannot be part of
14an equilibrium. However, this induces the suspect to choose bad behavior. The
suspect’s best reply to α = β = 0 is not γ = 1, but γ = 0, so γ = 1 is never
an equilibrium strategy. Note that this result occurs even though the judge is
benevolent (i.e. prefers correctly issued sanctions) and the monitoring signal




The equilibrium analysis reveals that the judge’s behavior does not depend on
his own payoﬀ parameters. The only parameters which inﬂuence his behavioral
strategies in the equilibria are B,P,r and w. In the lenient equilibrium, the
probability of punishment after having observed the signal realization i = b is













In the lenient equilibrium, a better signal quality (higher r or lower w), a
higher suspect’s beneﬁt B, or a lower sanction S increase the probability of
punishment after the judge has observed the bad signal realization.
The suspect chooses good behavior with probability γ2, which depends on













The probability of good behavior can be increased by increasing the judicial
reward for correct decisions, by lowering his disutility for wrong decisions, or by
increasing the signal quality.
In the draconian equilibrium, the judge chooses a mixed punishment strategy














15The draconian equilibrium induces the suspect to choose good behavior with
probability γ1. Again, this probability only depends on r,w,L and G. The signs













In this equilibrium, the signal quality has a negative impact not only on
the probability of wrongful punishment α∗, but also on the probability of good
behavior γ1. The ﬁrst of these insights is self-evident. The second is surprising,
but it is implied by the ﬁrst one. Better signal quality reduces the risk of
wrongful punishment. Therefore, it requires a lower value of γ to keep the
draconic judge indiﬀerent between his pure strategies.
3.4.2 Perfect or Uninformative Signals
The next proposition is concerned with two extreme cases of signal quality which
were excluded in the above analysis: an uninformative and a perfect signal.
Proposition 2: Consider the Bayesian Monitoring Game with G >
0 and L > 0. If r = w, then the equilibrium behavioral strategies
are γ = 0 and α = β = 1. If r = 1 and w = 0, then the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium is α = 0, β = 1, γ = 1.
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 2 considers a judge who has no monitoring skill,
i.e., with r = w. Then, the ﬁrst derivative of the suspect’s yield function would
always be negative, implying γ∗ = 0. Hence, the suspect would always choose
bad behavior. The judge’s best reply would be to always punish with positive
probability. As r = w and G,L > 0 imply γ1 = γ2 > 0, the judge chooses
α = β = 1.
The second part of the proposition concerns a judge of perfect monitoring
skill, who evaluates the case without errors (r = 1 and w = 0). This reduces the
game to a one with perfect information, a sequential version of the inspection
game (with zero monitoring cost). The judge’s best reply to good behavior is
acquittal, while bad behavior will be punished. Draconic punishment, combined
16with γ = 0 is also a Nash equilibrium of this game, but perfect compliance as
described in the proposition is the only subgame perfect equilibrium. Hence,
Bayesian monitoring can only induce the suspect to comply with certainty if the
monitoring signal is perfect.
3.4.3 Judicial Payoﬀs
The derived results depend on the assumptions G > 0 and L > 0: The judge
must derive utility from correct judgements and disutility from wrong ones.
Without such incentives (G = L = 0), monitoring would have no impact on the
suspect’s behavior, as this would imply γ1 = γ2 = 0. However, it is suﬃcient
for the derived results that G and L are positive, even if the values of these
parameters are negligible compared to B, X, and P.
4 Conclusions
The results of the Bayesian Monitoring Game presented here show four diﬀer-
ences from enforcement models in the tradition of Becker (1968):
• While in the Becker model the enforcement system either produces per-
fect deterrence or no deterrence at all, total deterrence is never part of a
Bayesian Monitoring Equilibrium. In all three Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
derived above, the probability of good behavior is smaller than one; bad
behavior occurs with positive probability.
• In the model presented here, there is no simple trade-oﬀ between the sanc-
tion and the probabilities with which punishment is issued. Furthermore,
the maximum ﬁne result of Becker (1968) is not sustained by this model.
Endogenizing the sanction would not alter the suspect’s incentives, as her
mixed strategy is not inﬂuenced by the height of the punishment.
• Moreover, the equilibrium probability of good behavior is independent of
the external damage, the initial wealth, and the internalized beneﬁt of
bad behavior. The suspect’s equilibrium strategy only depends on the
17parameters which reﬂect the judicial preference for correct judgements as
well as the quality of the judicial monitoring signal.
• The signal dependent probabilities of punishment are independent of the
suspect’s initial wealth and the negative externality caused by bad behav-
ior. The rational judge only takes into account the size of the sanction, the
suspect’s beneﬁt from bad behavior and the signal quality when choosing
his mixed strategy.
Even with costless signals and judicial benevolence, perfect enforcement can-
not be reached when the judge’s signal is only imperfect. The best outcome
which can be attained is a high probability of good behavior, as bad behavior
is ineﬃcient by assumption.
The model presented here shares some features with the inspection game.
The diﬀerence with regard to the assumptions concerns the monitoring signal.
In the inspection game, it is costly and perfect, here it is costless but imper-
fect. With regard to the results, the Bayesian Monitoring Game exhibits two
mixed strategy equilibria and one in pure strategies, while the inspection game
has only one mixed strategy equilibria. The Bayesian Monitoring Game can,
therefore, provide a positive explanation for diﬀerent monitoring styles. These
styles are characterized by the diﬀerent signal-contingent punishment probabil-
ities. Moreover, the diﬀerent punishment styles induce diﬀerent probabilities
with which the suspect chooses good behavior.
Comparative statics reveals that the signal quality governs both parties’ be-
havior. While a higher signal quality increases the probability of good behavior
in the lenient monitoring equilibrium, it has the opposite impact in the draco-
nian equilibrium. This reﬂects the suspect’s reaction to a lower probability of
wrongful punishment by a draconian judge to whom a better signal is available.
Punishment and compliance in the tyrannic equilibrium are independent of the
payoﬀ and signal quality parameters.
A policy implication from these results would be that society should employ
means to facilitate equilibrium selection of the lenient monitoring style. In this
equilibrium, investment in higher signal quality may improve compliance. In the
18draconian equilibrium, such investment would be counterproductive; as long as
the signal is informative, a lower signal quality leads to higher compliance rates
(which are, however, on a low level).
An important property of the Bayesian model presented here is the stochastic
involvement of judges. In models like Kirstein/Schmidtchen (1997), the judges
remain inactive when the parameters of the court system are adequately set
and the contracting parties comply with the law. They act in the “shadow”
of the courts, and the judges remain oﬀ the equilibrium path. If, however,
the parameters are set suboptimally, then each case is brought to court or
cooperation collapses completely. In a mixed strategy Bayesian Monitoring
Equilibrium, however, the judge may become active with positive probability.
This is certainly closer to reality.
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